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 THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT NEXUS 
AND THE FUTURE OF MANDATORY SENTENCES* 
WILLIAM W. BERRY III** 
In some respects, the Sixth and Eighth Amendments have followed parallel 
tracks in their modern development. In both contexts, statutory schemes emerged 
from a concern related to arbitrary and inconsistent sentencing outcomes. These 
statutory approaches sought to remedy the sentencing problem by imposing 
mandatory sentencing requirements. The Court subsequently found the 
mandatory approaches to be unconstitutional. 
Even so, in both contexts, mandatory sentencing outcomes persist. Part of the 
explanation for this lies in a judicial fear of sentencing discretion. Part of the 
explanation may also relate to a hesitancy to use the Constitution to restrict 
majoritarian legislative power. 
In light of this descriptive account, this Article advocates for the loosening of the 
vestiges of mandatory sentencing schemes in favor of increased sentencing 
discretion in individual cases through constitutional expansion. Specifically, the 
Article seeks to rebalance state and federal criminal sentencing decisions in light 
of individualized circumstances related to the purposes of punishment. 
In Part I, the Article tells the parallel stories of the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments and the constitutional limits placed on mandatory sentencing. Part 
II explores how and why elements of mandatory sentencing still persist. Finally, 
in Part III, the Article advocates for the minimization and, in some cases, 
elimination of mandatory sentencing schemes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In some respects, the Sixth1 and Eighth2 Amendments have followed 
parallel tracks in their modern development. The parallelism relates to their 
connection to criminal sentencing and the limits they place on mandatory 
sentencing. In both contexts, mandatory statutory schemes emerged from a 
concern related to arbitrary and inconsistent sentencing outcomes. The 
approach that intersected with the Sixth Amendment—the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”)—was a response to widespread sentencing disparity 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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in federal criminal cases.3 The Sixth Amendment limitations—imposed first in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey4 and later in United States v. Booker5—proscribed the fact-
finding of judges at sentencing of facts, other than the finding of a prior 
conviction,6 that increased the applicable statutory maximum sentence.7 The 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury includes the right to have all facts that 
raise the possible sentence found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury as 
elements of the crime.8 The application of the Sixth Amendment to the 
Guidelines had the effect of turning them from mandatory into advisory 
guidelines.9 
In the Eighth Amendment context, the mandatory statutory scheme—
mandatory death sentences—emerged as part of the response to the Court’s 
decision in Furman v. Georgia,10 which struck down the death penalty, as 
applied, for its random and arbitrary imposition.11 In the aftermath of Furman, 
states scrambled to pass new death penalty statutes to address the disparity in 
outcomes that arose from capital jury sentencing.12 In particular, North Carolina 
and Louisiana adopted mandatory death penalty statutes,13 but the Court held 
 
 3. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973) 
(criticizing sentencing disparities among federal judges). 
 4. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 5. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 6. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment does not require proof to a jury of a prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt to increase 
the statutory maximum sentence). 
 7. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. The use of factors other than a prior conviction now also applies to 
statutory minima. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116–17 (2013). 
 8. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 117; see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 216 (1977) (exploring 
what facts constitute elements of the crime); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (same); In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (same). 
 9. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46. 
 10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 11. Id. at 239–40; see also id. at 304–05 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The asserted public belief that 
murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a random few.”); id. at 
309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (likening the death penalty to being “struck by lightning” and stating 
that “the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of 
death has in fact been imposed”). 
 12. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 267 (2002) 
(asserting that “Furman . . . touched off the biggest flurry of capital punishment legislation the nation 
had ever seen”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH L. REV. 1, 48 (2007); Jonathan 
Simon, Why Do You Think They Call It CAPITAL Punishment? Reading the Killing State, 36 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 783, 795 (2002) (“Few other decisions of the Supreme Court have ever received a more rapid 
legislative response.”). 
 13. Act of June 19, 1973, 1937 La. Acts 109 (codified as amended at LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 
(Westlaw through the 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess.)); Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1201, 1974 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 323 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 
2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)). 
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that mandatory death sentences violated the Eighth Amendment.14 More 
recently, the Court has held that mandatory juvenile life without parole 
sentences (“JLWOP”) also violate the Eighth Amendment.15 
Even so, in both the Sixth and Eighth Amendment contexts, mandatory 
or pseudo-mandatory sentencing outcomes still persist. In the Sixth 
Amendment context, the Guidelines exert a heavy, pseudo-mandatory influence 
on federal sentencing outcomes with a supermajority of sentences falling within 
the Guidelines ranges.16 And in the Eighth Amendment context, the limits on 
mandatory sentences only apply to capital17 and JLWOP18 sentences.19 
Part of the explanation for this persistence of mandatory sentences may 
lie in a fear of sentencing discretion.20 The post-Booker cases and substantive 
appellate reasonableness review provide a meaningful incentive to follow the 
formerly mandatory guidelines.21 The Eighth Amendment restrictions on 
sentencing likewise implement categorical restrictions as opposed to case-by-
case balancing tests requiring sentencing discretion.22 
Part of the explanation may also relate to a hesitancy to use the 
Constitution to restrict majoritarian legislative power.23 The connection of the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), which promulgates the 
 
 14. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (striking down Louisiana’s new capital 
statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (striking down North Carolina’s new 
capital statute). 
 15. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012). For a detailed analysis on JWLOP 
sentencing in different counties of North Carolina from 1995 to 2017, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, 
Travis M. Seale-Carlisle, Karima Modjadidi & Kristen M. Renberg, Life Without Parole Sentencing in 
North Carolina, 99 N.C. L. REV. 279 (2021). 
 16. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS 85 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XRE6-4Q99] (illustrating that judges impose sentences conforming to the Guidelines 
between seventy-five percent and eighty-two percent of the time). 
 17. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 
 18. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
 19. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009) (describing the 
different approaches under the Eighth Amendment in capital and noncapital cases). 
 20. See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 4 (1998) (“The perceived transfer of discretion from the judge to the 
prosecutor . . . is a central reason for judicial discomfort with the new regime.”); William W. Berry III, 
Unusual Deference, 70 FLA. L. REV. 315, 331 (2018) [hereinafter Berry, Unusual Deference] (explaining 
that the mandatory sentences shift the sentencing discretion from the court to the prosecutor). 
 21. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 22. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 23. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 6 (1962) (explaining the countermajoritarian difficulty of having five 
Justices overrule the legislative majority when finding a statute unconstitutional); Barry Friedman, The 
Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 
153, 192 (2002). 
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Guidelines, to Congress has reinforced the majoritarian approach to the 
Guidelines, with the Court deferring to the legislature and the Commission.24 
The Court’s Sixth Amendment cases, in reinforcing the primacy of the 
Guidelines, have extended such deference.25 The Eighth Amendment limits on 
sentencing outcomes as applied to “different” cases—those involving the death 
penalty26 or JLWOP27—have meant that the Court similarly has not limited the 
use of mandatory sentences in other cases.28 
The exploration of the nexus between the Sixth and Eighth Amendments 
seems appropriate as part of this North Carolina Law Review symposium, which 
marks the twentieth anniversary of the Apprendi decision that gave rise to the 
Sixth Amendment’s limits on mandatory sentencing guidelines. By engaging in 
a robust analysis of the parallel use and response to mandatory and pseudo-
mandatory sentencing rules, this Article aims to advance a number of insights 
about the future of each Amendment with respect to possible sentencing 
reform. 
In light of this descriptive account, this Article advocates for loosening the 
vestiges of mandatory sentencing schemes in favor of increased sentencing 
discretion in individual cases. Specifically, the Article seeks to rebalance state 
and federal criminal sentencing decisions with individualized circumstances 
related to the purposes of punishment and argues for a more complete limitation 
on mandatory sentences. 
In Part I, the Article tells the parallel stories of the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments and the constitutional limits placed on mandatory sentencing. 
 
 24. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (making the Guidelines advisory as the 
remedy to the Sixth Amendment violation instead of abolishing the Guidelines). 
 25. See, e.g., Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1349 (2016); Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007). 
 26. The Court has long emphasized “death is different.” See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 
616–17 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that because “death is not reversible,” DNA evidence 
that the convictions of numerous persons on death row are unreliable is especially alarming); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (“There is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its 
severity and irrevocability.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (arguing that 
death differs from life imprisonment because of its “finality”). Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman 
is apparently the origin of the Court’s “death is different” capital jurisprudence. Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment in the United 
States.”); see Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118 (2004) (discussing the Court’s death-is-different jurisprudence); Carol S. 
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation 
of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370 (1995) (crediting Justice Brennan as the originator 
of this line of argument). 
 27. More recently, the Court has held that juveniles are “different” too. See Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); see also William W. Berry III, 
More Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1120–23 (2010); William W. 
Berry III, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 78 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1071–75 (2013) [hereinafter Berry, 
Eighth Amendment Differentness]. 
 28. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1145. 
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Part II explores how and why elements of mandatory sentencing still persist. 
Finally, in Part III, the Article explains how the two constitutional provisions 
inform one another and open the door for the minimization, and in some cases 
elimination, of mandatory sentencing schemes. 
I.  THE RISE OF THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT LIMITS ON 
MANDATORY SENTENCING 
The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury serves, at least in the 
Apprendi line of cases, to require that facts be determined at trial rather than at 
sentencing.29 The core function of this requirement is to accord these facts their 
appropriate level of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—and ensure they are 
determined by the appropriate arbiter—a jury, not a judge.30 
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishments likewise removes substantive considerations from sentencing. 
Instead of facts, however, the Eighth Amendment limits the consideration of 
certain “different” punishments31 under certain circumstances in light of the 
characterization of the offense32 or the offender.33 
Where the two restrictions parallel each other is in their use of limits to 
circumscribe mandatory sentences. To understand what gave rise to these 
applications, it is instructive to first explain why legislatures adopted mandatory 
sentences in the first place. 
A. The Problem of Unfettered Sentencing Discretion 
The adoption of a mandatory sentencing scheme has two basic effects. The 
first overt effect is the restriction of the judge’s discretion at sentencing. A 
judge, for instance, may not sentence below a mandatory minimum sentence 
imposed by a statute for a particular crime once a jury finds the individual guilty 
of the crime. To the extent that judicial sentencing is creating a wide disparity 
of outcomes in similar cases, a mandatory scheme can reduce or eliminate that 
disparity.34 
 
 29. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2002); Ring, 536 U.S. at 589; 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 30. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293; Ring, 536 U.S. at 589; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 31. Barkow, supra note 19, at 1146; Berry, Eighth Amendment Differentness, supra note 27, at 1069. 
 32. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (barring the death penalty for rape); Kennedy 
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–42 (2008) (barring the death penalty for child rape). 
 33. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (barring the death penalty for juveniles); Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring the death penalty for intellectually disabled offenders). 
 34. Of course, defining “similar” cases is fraught with its own difficulties, as a wide range of 
conduct and culpability can fall under a single criminal statute. Felony murder is perhaps the most 
obvious example of this problem, as felony murder does not require a mens rea with respect to the 
homicide and thus treats premeditated killings and unintentional killings as “similar” cases. 
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The second more implicit effect of adopting mandatory sentencing 
schemes is the diversion of sentencing power from the judge to the prosecutor. 
In a system where the sentencing outcomes are mandatory, a prosecutor can 
effectively choose the sentence for an individual by choosing what criminal 
charge to pursue against the individual.35 The surety of the sentencing outcome 
accords this power, as opposed to a discretionary scheme in which judicial 
discretion makes sentencing less predictable. 
Indeed, one might understand the effect of mandatory sentencing schemes 
as not eliminating sentencing disparity at all but instead relocating it. In the 
example of the Guidelines, mandatory guidelines situate the sentencing 
discretion with the prosecutor but are unable to address the disparity created by 
prosecutorial decision-making. Similarly, in the death penalty context, 
mandatory death sentences shift the sentencing decision from the jury to the 
prosecutor.36 Jury nullification with respect to the crime in question inserts its 
own form of disparity and inconsistency in the place of inconsistency in jury 
sentencing.37 
1.  The Indeterminate Sentencing Era 
The Constitution does not specify which branch of government possesses 
responsibility for federal sentencing, but it is well established that Congress has 
the power to set the sentence for a particular crime as well as control the scope 
of judicial sentencing discretion.38 For over 200 years, Congress provided 
statutory maxima or sentencing ranges and left federal judges broad sentencing 
discretion under the applicable statutes.39 Supporting this understanding of 
broad sentencing discretion was the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of 
 
 35. This is particularly true because of the proliferation of state and federal statutes that overlap, 
such that one criminal act can result in culpability for a number of different crimes. 
 36. See infra Sections I.A.2, I.B.2. 
 37. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198–99 (1971). 
 38. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (first citing United States v. Wiltberger, 
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820); and then citing ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916)); see also United 
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (“The legislative authority of the Union must first 
make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the 
offense.”). 
 39. See Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78 
JUDICATURE 169, 169–70 (1995) (discussing how in 1970 “the federal government had indeterminate 
sentencing systems, in which lawmakers enacted and amended the criminal code and set maximum 
penalties”); Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. 
REV. 83, 86 (1988) (discussing how prior to sentencing guidelines “the trial court had wide discretion 
in determining the appropriate sentence”). This concept was also codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) 
(“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct 
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the 
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”). 
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the Evarts Act,40 limiting the ability of appellate courts to review sentencing 
decisions of trial judges.41 
In this indeterminate sentencing era, there was often a lack of consistency 
in sentencing outcomes.42 Judge Frankel described a sentencing judge’s “almost 
wholly unchecked and sweeping” discretion as “terrifying and intolerable for a 
society that professes devotion to the rule of law.”43 The continuing sentencing 
disparity in federal sentences ultimately gave rise to the formation of the 
Commission and the Guidelines in 1984.44 
2.  Arbitrary and Random Capital Sentencing 
A decade before the adoption of the Guidelines, the Supreme Court 
addressed a different kind of sentencing disparity. Instead of sentences for 
federal crimes, the concern related to the disparity in capital sentencing 
outcomes in death penalty states.45 
In 1971, the Court first addressed this issue in McGautha v. California,46 
which consolidated twin Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the states’ use 
of the death penalty in California and Ohio.47 One of the defendants, 
McGautha, argued that his sentence violated his procedural due process rights 
because the death penalty statute at issue gave the jury no guidance on when to 
 
 40. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The 
Evarts Act established the federal circuit courts of appeal. Id. § 2, 26 Stat. at 826. 
 41. The Court explained, “If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly 
established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits 
allowed by a statute.” Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440–41 (1974) (quoting Gurera v. 
United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340–41 (8th Cir. 1930)). 
 42. Numerous studies from the indeterminate-sentencing era demonstrated that the differences 
among judges in their sentencing philosophies caused this disparity. See, e.g., ANTHONY PARTRIDGE 
& WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUD. CTR., THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A 
REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 36–40 (1974); John S. Carroll, William T. 
Perkowitz, Arthur J. Lurigio & Frances M. Weaver, Sentencing Goals, Causal Attributions, Ideology, and 
Personality, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 107, 107–08 (1987); Kevin Clancy, John Bartolomeo, 
David Richardson & Charles Wellford, Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the 
Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 528–29 (1981); Shari 
Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 110–11 (1975). 
 43. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 5. 
 44. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 2017–
24 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1)). This scheme went into effect in 1987. 
See generally Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentencing 
Commission, 1985–1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167 (2017) (describing the process of developing the 
Commission after its adoption in 1984 until its implementation in 1987). 
 45. These disparities included race, as evidenced in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), in 
which the defendant produced a study showing that Black defendants who kill White victims were 
most likely to receive the death penalty. Id. at 287; see also JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY 
THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 151 (2015). 
 46. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
 47. Id. at 185. 
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impose a death sentence.48 Indeed, the California statute granted juries wide 
discretion in imposing sentences, ranging from a minimal sentence to a death 
sentence.49 
The other defendant, Crampton, made a similar argument with respect to 
the Ohio capital statute and also took issue with the unitary trial structure.50 In 
Ohio, the court did not separate guilt and sentencing decisions into separate 
proceedings; the jury decided both guilt and punishment at the same time.51 
Crampton argued that this trial structure violated his constitutional rights 
because it required him to choose between contesting his guilt and arguing for 
a lower sentence.52 
In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that both statutes were constitutional.53 
According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment did not place any 
restriction on unitary trials and did not require any limit be placed on jury 
sentencing.54 Part of the Court’s reasoning related to the problematic use of 
mandatory capital sentences in England.55 The Court reasoned that the 
likelihood of jury nullification that occurred in mandatory capital sentencing 
schemes cautioned against placing limits on a jury’s sentencing discretion.56 
A year after McGautha, the Court reversed course. In considering an 
Eighth Amendment challenge to the use of the death penalty with a similar 
theory to that adopted by the defendants in McGautha, the Court held 5–4 in 
Furman that the death penalty, as applied, violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban on cruel and unusual punishments.57 In addition to the Court’s brief per 
curiam opinion, each of the five Justices in the majority wrote an individual 
opinion explaining why the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment.58 
Abandoning the views adopted in McGautha, the Court took issue with 
the broad discretion given to the jury, particularly with the range of potential 
sentences, the lack of guidance as to when a death sentence was proper, and the 
absence of bifurcation between the guilt and sentencing phases of trial.59 In this 
vein, Justice Stewart concluded that the death penalty as applied constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment because it was “so wantonly and so freakishly 
 
 48. Id. at 187–91. 
 49. Id. at 190. 
 50. Id. at 191–95. 
 51. Id. at 191–92. 
 52. Id. at 208–09. 
 53. Id. at 186. 
 54. Id. at 207, 213. 
 55. Id. at 197–98, 204–05. 
 56. Id. at 199–201. 
 57. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
 58. Id. at 240. 
 59. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[W]e deal with a system of law and of justice that 
leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants 
committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned.”). 
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imposed.”60 Justice Brennan agreed: “When the punishment of death is inflicted 
in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is 
virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily.”61 
The rarity of the death penalty further contributed to the majority’s view 
that its use was arbitrary. Justice White found that “the death penalty is exacted 
with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from 
the many cases in which it is not.”62 
At its heart, the Furman decision found the death penalty unconstitutional 
because there were no indicia or standards determining which murders 
warranted a punishment of death and which did not. Thus there was no 
mechanism to ensure that like cases are treated alike. Justice Brennan explained: 
No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those 
terms the few who die from the many who go to prison. Crimes and 
criminals simply do not admit of a distinction that can be drawn so finely 
as to explain, on that ground, the execution of such a tiny sample of those 
eligible.63 
The Court in Furman highlighted the absence of a principle by which to 
distinguish murderers deserving death from “ordinary” murderers deserving a 
lesser sentence.64 This was the direct consequence of jury sentencing. 
B. Mandatory Responses to Standardless Sentencing 
Mandatory sentences are not the only response to the standardless 
sentencing described by Judge Frankel in the federal courts and by Furman in 
state capital cases. Standards and guided discretion provide a middle-ground, 
albeit imperfect,65 solution to the disparity described. 
For some, the complete lack of guidance in federal sentencing and state 
death penalty states required more intervention.66 As such, some believed that 
 
 60. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan further commented, “Indeed, [the 
administration of the death penalty] smacks of little more than a lottery system.” Id. 
 62. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Brennan emphasized its rarity, explaining, 
“[D]eath is inflicted in only a minute fraction of these cases.” Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. 
 65. One could argue that the modern “aggravating and mitigating circumstances” approach to the 
death penalty is one example, but its manifold flaws might counsel otherwise. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 
U.S. 863, 908 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The same might be said for Minnesota’s system of 
sentencing guidelines. See RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 
FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 121–22 (2013) (analyzing the overall efficacy of the “Morris-Minnesota 
model” of sentencing guidelines). 
 66. See FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 104–05 (noting the “need for broad and drastic reform of the 
law” from elected lawmakers). 
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the appropriate response to unguided discretion from this perspective would be 
to remove the discretion altogether or almost altogether. 
1.  The Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines 
The Guidelines did not entirely remove sentencing discretion from federal 
judges but instead circumscribed their discretion in very serious ways.67 They 
required that judges calculate the appropriate range of six months on the 
sentencing grid and then impose the sentence determined by the Guidelines in 
most cases.68 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198469 specified that the Guidelines 
sentence ranges must be within the statutory limits set by Congress and must 
be applied by federal district judges except in cases where an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance existed which was not adequately considered by the 
Commission.70 The Guidelines were thus mandatory and in most cases gave a 
six-month range within which judges could exercise sentencing discretion.71 
In addition, the Act slightly altered the judicial discretion of the federal 
courts of appeals in reviewing decisions. Modifying the principle that appellate 
courts have no power to overturn a sentence that is within the limits allowed by 
a statute,72 Congress permitted appellate review under the Guidelines when the 
district court sentenced an offender outside the Guidelines range, or the district 
court incorrectly applied the Guidelines.73 In 2003, Congress modified the clear 
 
 67. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2004) (“The 
sentencing judge must select a sentence from within the guideline range.”). 
 68. Id. The sentencing grid pinpoints the applicable Guidelines sentence with a vertical axis 
increasing downward based on the level of the crime committed under the Guidelines (in levels from 
1 to 43) and a horizontal axis increasing based on the level of prior criminal history of the defendant 
(in categories from I to VI). See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018). 
 69. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 
28 U.S.C.). 
 70. Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2019–20 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)–(b)); id. 
§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 1989–90 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)–(b)). 
 71. See id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2)); see also U.S. 
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(2) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2004) (“The statute contemplates 
the guidelines will establish a range of sentences for every coordination of categories. Where the 
guidelines call for imprisonment, the range must be narrow: the maximum imprisonment cannot exceed 
the minimum by more than greater of 25 percent or six months.”). 
 72. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974) (“Although well-established 
doctrine bars review of the exercise of sentencing discretion, limited review is available when 
sentencing discretion is not exercised at all.”) 
 73. Thus, an offender may appeal a sentence when it “is greater than the sentence specified in the 
applicable guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of 
imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum established in the guideline range,” 
and the government may appeal when the sentence “is less than the sentence specified in the applicable 
guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a lesser fine or term of imprisonment, 
probation, or supervised release than the minimum established in the guideline range.” Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, § 213(a), 98 Stat. at 2011 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3)). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1311 (2021) 
1322 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99-5 
error standard and permitted de novo review of sentences outside the 
Guidelines range (departures).74 This change in appellate review reinforced the 
limits mandatory guidelines placed on judicial sentencing discretion. 
2.  The Mandatory Death Penalty 
A mandatory death penalty provides no escape valve for the judge or jury 
at sentencing; if the defendant receives a guilty verdict, death is the sentence. 
In North Carolina and Louisiana, the state legislatures adopted mandatory 
death statutes in light of Furman.75 These statutes mandated that any individual 
convicted of first-degree murder would receive the death penalty.76 
The North Carolina statute included several categories of murder in its 
definition of murder, including premeditated killings and felony murders.77 
Despite the best efforts of the legislature, it is clear that this definition 
encompassed a wide range of homicides with varying levels of offender 
culpability. 
The Louisiana statute made it so that only felony murders where the 
offender possessed the specific intent to kill would qualify as death-eligible, 
first-degree murders.78 While narrower than the North Carolina statute, the 
Louisiana statute nonetheless created a range of potential levels of culpability 
for individuals committing homicides that could qualify as capital murders. 
 
 74. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 670 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)). 
 75. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (“The post-Furman legislation mandates 
imposition of the death penalty . . . .”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 280 (1976) 
(“Following [Furman,] the North Carolina law that previously had provided that in cases of first-degree 
murder the jury in its unbridled discretion could choose whether the convicted defendant should be 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment was changed to make the death penalty mandatory for that 
crime.”). 
 76. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331–32; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286–87. 
 77. The North Carolina statute provided: 
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, 
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which 
shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, 
kidnapping, burglary, or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and 
shall be punished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second 
degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor more 
than life imprisonment in the State’s prison. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975). 
 78. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 329. The statute provides in part that first-degree murder is the killing 
of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is 
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnaping, aggravated rape, or 
armed robbery. Id. 
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C. Constitutional Limitations on Mandatory Sentencing 
The Sixth and Eighth Amendment nexus arises in the similarity of their 
respective limits on the imposition of mandatory sentences. Indeed, both 
constitutional provisions dealt a serious blow to mandatory sentencing schemes 
but not one that erased mandatory sentences altogether. 
1.  Apprendi, Booker, and Advisory Guidelines 
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi, commencing a Sixth 
Amendment revolution that significantly impacted federal and state sentencing, 
at least with respect to mandatory guidelines.79 Apprendi concerned the Sixth 
Amendment challenge to a sentencing enhancement based on a hate crime 
statute.80 The Court held 5–4 that the judicial determination of the facts 
underlying the hate crime enhancement, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.81 The Court 
concluded that any fact, other than a prior conviction,82 that increases the 
statutorily mandated sentence is an element of the crime and thus must be 
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.83 
In Booker, the Court applied its holding in Apprendi to the Guidelines.84 
The district court in Booker had used judge-found facts to calculate the 
mandatory sentence under the Guidelines.85 The Court held 5–4 that this 
determination violated Booker’s Sixth Amendment rights.86 Indeed, the Court 
found, as it had in Apprendi, that all judge-made factual determinations that 
increased the applicable mandatory Guidelines’ sentence violated the Sixth 
Amendment.87 
One of the five Justices in the majority, Justice Ginsburg, joined the four 
dissenters to fashion the appropriate remedy to the Sixth Amendment 
violation.88 This remedial majority held that making the mandatory sentencing 
under the Guidelines advisory would eliminate the constitutional violation.89 
In other words, the facts that the judge found by applying the Guidelines would 
 
 79. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000). Indeed, Apprendi is one of the most cited 
criminal cases of this century. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?, 
69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 391 (2016) (showing the number of times Apprendi has been cited by federal 
courts and tribunals). 
 80. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474–76. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998). 
 83. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 84. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
 85. See id. at 235–36. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 244–49. 
 89. See id. at 265. 
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not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights if the judge was not 
mandated to follow the Guidelines.90 
2.  Woodson, Miller, and Individualized Sentencing Determinations 
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases assessing the 
constitutionality of state capital sentencing schemes adopted in response to its 
decision in Furman. This included Woodson v. North Carolina,91 in which the 
Court struck down the North Carolina death penalty scheme in which all 
individuals convicted of first-degree murder received a mandatory death 
sentence.92 The Court explained that “[t]he inadequacy of distinguishing 
between murderers solely on the basis of legislative criteria” was the very reason 
that “led the States to grant juries sentencing discretion in capital cases.”93 The 
Court also emphasized the likelihood of juries declining to find a defendant 
guilty where they believed the death penalty was not the appropriate sentence.94 
Given these deficiencies, the Court found that the North Carolina system 
failed to address the concerns of Furman.95 Justice Stewart explained: 
In view of the historic record, it is only reasonable to assume that many 
juries under mandatory statutes will continue to consider the grave 
consequences of a conviction in reaching a verdict. North Carolina’s 
mandatory death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the jury 
in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree 
murderers shall live and which shall die. And there is no way under the 
North Carolina law for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious 
exercise of that power through a review of death sentences.96 
The holding in Woodson made clear that the Court believed that 
constitutional capital punishment schemes must give juries (or trial judges) a 
way to differentiate meaningfully between first-degree murders in determining 
a sentence. These requirements were consistent with the broad principle that 
capital-sentencing decisions require individualized sentencing determinations 
in order to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment. In other words, the judge 
or jury must consider the case-specific characteristics of the crime and the 
individual defendant. The broad categories articulated by the legislature were 
insufficient on their own to determine when death was an appropriate sentence. 
 
 90. See id. 
 91. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 92. Id. at 305. 
 93. Id. at 291. 
 94. Id. at 295–98. Indeed, in McGautha, the Court had recognized the possibility of jury 
nullification in capital cases in which sentencing was based on mandatory statutes. McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1976). 
 95. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302–03. 
 96. Id. at 303. 
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The Court also decided Roberts v. Louisiana97 on the same day as Woodson.98 
In Roberts, the Court applied its reasoning from Woodson in reaching the same 
conclusion—mandatory death penalty statutes violate the Eighth 
Amendment.99 The Court found that Louisiana’s statute was not 
constitutionally distinguishable from North Carolina’s statute and that it failed 
to provide adequate individualized sentencing determinations.100 
In Lockett v. Ohio,101 two years after Woodson, the Supreme Court 
broadened the principle articulated in Woodson by striking down the Ohio 
capital statute under the Eighth Amendment for not allowing adequate 
consideration of the individual characteristics of the offender.102 At the time, 
Ohio’s capital statute required that offenders found guilty of an aggravating 
circumstance had to prove at least one statutory mitigating circumstance by a 
preponderance of the evidence to avoid a death sentence.103 In overturning the 
death sentence of Sandra Lockett,104 the Court held that the statute violated the 
Eighth Amendment because it limited the consideration of the offender’s 
mitigating evidence.105 As Chief Justice Burger explained, 
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving 
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character 
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation 
creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors 
which may call for a less severe penalty.106 
As a result, after Lockett, “[t]o meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty 
statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors.”107 
The Court extended this proscription against mandatory death sentences 
to mandatory JLWOP sentences in Miller v. Alabama.108 Finding that if “death 
 
 97. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 98. Id. at 325 (noting date of decision as July 2, 1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280 (noting date of 
decision as July 2, 1976). 
 99. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331–36. 
 100. Id. at 335–36. 
 101. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 102. Id. at 586. 
 103. The Ohio statute at issue limited the mitigating evidence to three categories: (1) the victim 
of the offense induced or facilitated it; (2) it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, 
but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation; and (3) the offense 
was primarily the product of the offender’s psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is 
insufficient to establish the defense of insanity. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (LEXIS 
through File 8 of the 134th (2021-2022) Gen. Assemb.). 
 104. Sandra Lockett played, at most, a very minor role in the crime. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 590–
91. She was the driver of the getaway car in an armed robbery and was prosecuted under a theory of 
felony murder, as there was no evidence that she or her coconspirators intended to kill. Id. 
 105. Id. at 608. 
 106. Id. at 605. 
 107. Id. at 608. 
 108. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
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is different” then juveniles are “different too,” the Court held that mandatory 
JLWOP sentences violated the Eighth Amendment.109 As with Woodson, the 
Court emphasized the importance of individualized sentencing determinations 
and consideration of applicable mitigating evidence, including the age of the 
offender.110 
II.  THE PERSISTENCE OF MANDATORY SENTENCING 
Despite both the Sixth and Eighth Amendment limitations imposed by 
the Court on mandatory sentences, mandatory and pseudo-mandatory 
sentences still persist. After describing how this kind of sentence has persisted, 
this part explores some explanations for that persistence. 
A. How Mandatory Sentencing Persists 
In the context of federal criminal sentencing, pseudo-mandatory sentences 
persist because federal judges still treat the Guidelines as if they were 
mandatory in the supermajority of cases.111 In the context of state criminal 
sentencing (and federal mandatory minimum sentences), mandatory sentences 
persist because the Court has been unwilling to extend its individualized 
sentencing jurisprudence beyond death penalty and JLWOP sentences. 
1.  The Influence of the Sentencing Guidelines 
Following Booker, the Guidelines became advisory in order to comply with 
the Sixth Amendment.112 And yet, the cases that followed help to ensure that 
the Guidelines remained the key driver in sentencing outcomes. 
The remedy in Booker eliminated the mandatory nature of the Guidelines, 
but not the role of the Guidelines themselves.113 Under Justice Breyer’s remedial 
opinion, district courts still begin the sentencing process by calculating the 
applicable Guidelines sentence.114 
This calculation effectively anchors the sentencing decision. The question 
then becomes whether to depart from the applicable Guidelines sentence. This 
determination is more than a point of reference. It is, in essence, a thumb on 
the scale in favor of the Guidelines sentence, such that it becomes presumptive. 
In making this determination of what sentence to impose, the district court 
must apply the applicable statute—18 U.S.C. § 3553.115 This statute contains a 
 
 109. Id. at 470, 481 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991)). 
 110. Id. at 486–87. 
 111. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 16, at 85. 
 112. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–49 (2005). 
 113. Id. at 258–65. 
 114. Id. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those 
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”). 
 115. Id. at 244–49. 
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parsimony provision (requiring the least punishment required) and asks courts 
to apply the purposes of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation116—to determine the appropriate sentence.117 Because this 
statute was adopted at the same time as the Guidelines, many courts presume 
an equivalency between the Guidelines range and the statute.118 
Finally, the Booker opinion established reasonableness review as a means 
for appellate review of sentences made under advisory guidelines—in part to 
protect against the arbitrary sentencing that inspired the Guidelines in the 
1980s.119 This appellate review consists of a procedural review (whether the 
lower court applied § 3553) and a substantive review (whether the sentence was 
reasonable).120 
The post-Booker cases only served to reinforce this norm of following the 
advisory guidelines, rather than exercising independent judicial discretion. In 
Rita v. United States,121 the Court held that sentences within the Guidelines 
range are presumed reasonable.122 This decision alleviated the need to meet the 
procedural and substantive reasonableness requirements as long as a judge 
remains within the Guidelines. Other subsequent decisions have emphasized 
the centrality of the Guidelines to the “advisory” federal sentencing process.123 
Even so, the Court has made clear that district judges have discretion to 
depart from the Guidelines. In United States v. Gall,124 the Court held that 
 
 116. Note that this is in some ways a quixotic errand, as the purposes of punishment can point to 
contrary sentencing outcomes when applied. See William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: 
The Need To Give Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 642–45 (2008). 
 117. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)–(b)(1). 
 118. See supra note 16. 
 119. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264–65 (“These features of the remaining system, while not the system 
Congress enacted, nonetheless continue to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction, helping 
to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize 
sentences where necessary.”). 
 120. See id. at 258–64. 
 121. 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 122. Id. at 341. 
 123. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2018) (“In addition this Court’s precedents 
since Freeman have further confirmed that the Guidelines remain the foundation of federal sentencing 
decisions.”); Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 895 (2017) (“Our holding today does not render 
the advisory Guidelines immune from constitutional scrutiny.”); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) (“Today’s holding follows from the essential framework the Guidelines 
establish for sentencing proceedings.”); Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 533 (2013) (“We 
consider here whether there is an ex post facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under 
Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher 
applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense.”); Freeman 
v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 525 (2011) (“The Justices who join this plurality opinion conclude that 
. . . [i]n every case the judge must exercise discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. This 
discretion, in turn, is framed by the Guidelines.”); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 487 (2011) 
(considering whether a “downward variance” from the Guidelines is justified in a case of post-
sentencing rehabilitation). 
 124. 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
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sentences outside the Guidelines range are not presumptively unreasonable.125 
Similarly, in Kimbrough v. United States,126 the Court held that a district judge 
could adopt a lower sentence, outside of the Guidelines, where the judge had a 
policy disagreement with the Guidelines.127 In Kimbrough, the Court rejected 
the one-hundred-to-one ratio of crack cocaine to powder cocaine, and instead 
applied an eighteen-to-one ratio in determining the applicable sentence.128 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Rita emphasizes the idea that the 
Guidelines are not simply a reflection of the proper application of § 3553 to 
criminal conduct.129 Justice Stevens wrote: 
The Commission has not developed any standards or recommendations 
that affect sentencing ranges for many individual characteristics. Matters 
such as age, education, mental or emotional condition, medical condition 
(including drug or alcohol addiction), employment history, lack of 
guidance as a youth, family ties, or military, civic, charitable, or public 
service are not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines.130 
There is a false equivalency here—the Guidelines largely reflect a retributive 
model of punishment, requiring the examination of the crime and criminal 
culpability, combined with a sentencing enhancement based on incapacitation 
related to prior criminal conduct. The other utilitarian purposes of punishment 
in § 3553, which a court must explicitly consider, are either ignored (deterrence) 
or explicitly disfavored (rehabilitation) by the Guidelines.131 
The Court, however, has continued to emphasize the primacy of the 
guidelines despite the Booker remedy’s conversion of Guidelines from 
mandatory to advisory. Justice Sotomayor has explained, “The Guidelines 
anchor every sentence imposed in federal district courts.”132 And the Court has 
repeatedly noted that “the Guidelines are in a real sense the basis for the 
sentence.”133 As such, “[t]hat a district court may ultimately sentence a given 
defendant outside the Guidelines range does not deprive the Guidelines of force 
as the framework for sentencing.”134 
This weight ascribed to the Guidelines also manifests itself on appellate 
review. An incorrect Guidelines calculation is a reversible procedural error.135 
 
 125. Id. at 40–41. 
 126. 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 127. Id. at 90–91. 
 128. Id. at 110–12. 
 129. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 360–67 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 130. Id. at 364–65. 
 131. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 132. Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 898 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 133. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 542 (2013)). 
 134. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 542 (2013). 
 135. Id. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1311 (2021) 
2021] THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT NEXUS 1329 
The Guidelines serve as the benchmark for reasonableness, helping to iron out 
sentencing differences in order to promote uniformity.136 This includes 
considering the extent of the deviation from the Guidelines.137 
Not surprisingly in light of the Court’s rhetoric, federal judges have leaned 
heavily on the Guidelines over the past fifteen years, despite the increased 
discretion offered by Booker. Historically, judges have followed the Guidelines 
range in over eighty percent of cases, with the percentage dropping to seventy-
five percent in recent years.138 Judges who follow the Guidelines enjoy the ease 
of having the sentence calculated by an objective measure and avoid 
reasonableness scrutiny on review. 
To the extent that the Guidelines persist in influencing the outcomes of 
individual sentencing decisions, a pseudo-mandatory sentencing scheme 
persists. If judges are unlikely to move outside of the Guidelines except in 
unusual cases, the power shift to prosecutors that is present under a mandatory 
guideline system remains. 
2.  The “Differentness” Limits on Individualized Sentencing 
While the Court’s application of the Sixth Amendment allowed the 
Guidelines to persist, the application of the Eighth Amendment drew a bright 
line that eliminated mandatory death sentences139 and, later, mandatory 
JLWOP sentences.140 
Prior to Miller, the Court’s approach to noncapital cases under the Eighth 
Amendment had been to exclude noncapital cases from heightened scrutiny and 
essentially presume their constitutionality. In contrast to its evolving standards 
of decency jurisprudence,141 the Supreme Court has adopted a different test 
under the Eighth Amendment in noncapital, non-JLWOP cases.142 This 
approach asks whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the 
 
 136. Id.; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 263 (2005). 
 137. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 
 138. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 16, at 85. 
 139. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1145. 
 140. William W. Berry III, The Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 338 (2014). 
 141. The evolving standards of decency test uses objective and subjective indicia to determine 
whether a punishment as applied violates the Eighth Amendment and has limited the use of the death 
penalty and JLWOP based on the character of the offense, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 584 
(1977) (barring the death penalty for rape); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–42 (2008) 
(barring the death penalty for child rape), and based on the character of the offender, see Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (barring the death penalty for juveniles). 
 142. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1145; see also Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? 
Examining the Supreme Court’s “Culture of Death”, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861, 861 (2008) (distinguishing 
between capital and noncapital sentencing systems). 
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criminal conduct at issue.143 With one exception, the Court has uniformly held 
over the past fifty years that noncapital, non-JLWOP punishments do not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.144 
Solem v. Helm145 is the one case in which the Court found an adult 
noncapital punishment to be disproportionate. In Solem, the Court overturned 
a life without parole sentence for a seventh nonviolent felony and advanced a 
basic test to assess proportionality.146 Specifically, the Court explained that the 
Eighth Amendment required consideration of (1) the gravity of the offense and 
the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in 
the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.147 Note that the Solem test incorporates cruel 
considerations—the gravity of the offense—and unusual considerations—the 
sentences imposed upon other offenders.148 
The Supreme Court, however, limited the scope of Solem in Harmelin v. 
Michigan149 in a divided opinion.150 Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence 
reemphasized that the Eighth Amendment only bars disproportionate 
punishments that are “grossly disproportionate,” with reviewing courts granting 
“substantial deference to legislative determinations.”151 Harmelin thus 
reestablished that the Eighth Amendment does not require perfect 
proportionality.152 
The part of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Harmelin that was joined by four 
other Justices also found that while Harmelin’s sentence of life without parole 
 
 143. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 64 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 11–
12 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372–73 
(1982) (per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). 
 144. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18, 30–31 (affirming sentence of twenty-five years to life for stealing 
approximately $1,200 worth of golf clubs, where defendant had four prior felony convictions); Lockyer, 
538 U.S. at 66, 77 (affirming on habeas review two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life 
for stealing approximately $150 worth of videotapes, where defendant had three prior felony 
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for a first-time drug offense might be cruel, it was not unusual.153 One way, 
then, of understanding the gross disproportionality test is as requiring a 
punishment to be both cruel and unusual.154 The corollary of this concept is that 
a punishment might be cruel even if it is not grossly disproportionate under the 
Eighth Amendment. A logical distinction might be that a strictly 
disproportionate punishment might be cruel, but it must also be unusual to meet 
the gross disproportionality standard under the Eighth Amendment. 
Further, the part of the opinion joined by four Justices also emphasized 
the distinction between capital and noncapital cases under the Eighth 
Amendment as developed in prior cases.155 If the analysis under the evolving 
standards of decency doctrine mandates a strict scrutiny kind of examination of 
the punishment, its cruelty, and its unusualness, then the analysis under the 
gross disproportionality test mirrors a rational basis test, where there is a strong 
presumption that the punishment is constitutional.156 
Thus, the Court’s development of its individualized-sentencing-
consideration requirement under the Eighth Amendment has applied only to 
cases in the “different” categories of the death penalty and JLWOP sentences. 
While the Court’s decision in Miller confirmed that juveniles are different, it 
did not address the issue of whether other categories of differentness existed.157 
The Miller Court also did not offer any reason as to why its individualized 
sentencing requirement would be limited to “different” cases. 
For now, however, the bright-line standard remains, meaning that other 
categories of mandatory sentences essentially avoid any meaningful scrutiny 
under the Eighth Amendment. Two categories of mandatory noncapital 
sentences avoid individualized sentencing consideration as a result: mandatory 
minimums and adult life without parole sentences (“LWOP”). 
The same principles of individualized sentencing the Court used in 
Woodson and Miller apply to mandatory minimum sentences. The Court just has 
to decide to apply higher scrutiny to such cases. These cases, as explained above, 
delegate sentencing power to prosecutors and deny individuals rights that 
should arise under the Eighth Amendment. 
The same is true for LWOP sentences. Some LWOP sentences 
themselves are mandatory sentences. In some capital jurisdictions, the only 
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sentencing options are LWOP and the death penalty in cases of aggravated 
murder.158 As LWOP is a form of a death sentence, this essentially allows 
mandatory death sentences to persist. 
Even if they are not mandatory, some LWOP sentences have pseudo-
mandatory characteristics because they are the product of parole abolition, not 
legislative design.159 States might have intended a life sentence to be a 
punishment in which most offenders served a fifteen-year sentence.160 With the 
abolition of parole, the “life” sentence of fifteen years has automatically become 
LWOP, creating a sentence where adequate legislative consideration may have 
never existed.161 
B. Why Mandatory Sentencing Persists 
Two principles undergird the persistence of mandatory and pseudo-
mandatory sentencing schemes in state and federal sentencing. The fear of 
unfettered sentencing practices, as raised by Judge Frankel and referenced in 
Furman, supports the desire to limit sentencing discretion to, at the very least, 
restrict random and arbitrary outcomes. The fear of constitutional 
countermajoritarian overreach colors the other reason for persistence of 
mandatory sentencing. 
1.  Fear of Unfettered Sentencing Practices 
First, given the former state of sentencing as described by Judge 
Frankel,162 a move to unfettered discretion seems unattractive for some. This is 
particularly true given the almost two-decade reign of the mandatory sentencing 
guidelines from 1987 to 2005. The comfort provided by the Guidelines as a 
tried-and-true approach to sentencing has meant that a wholesale move away 
from the Guidelines and its principles remains unlikely. 
In many senses, a consistent move away from the Guidelines might signal 
a step in the direction of the Frankel era. To move away from the Guidelines 
in a particular case, as an exception to a rule, does not appear to be problematic 
for judges, but a consistent move away has not been common outside of 
particular policy disagreements with the Guidelines themselves. 
To the extent that wildly departing from the Guidelines would create 
significant disparity, the move to advisory guidelines has not encouraged such 
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a reality. Instead, the sentencing outcomes from 2005 to 2020 are not unlike 
those from 1987 to 2005; they largely follow the Guidelines. 
Note, however, that this outcome does not mean consistency has carried 
the day and disparity ceases to exist. On the contrary, disparity may extend 
further because it remains hidden in the decision-making of federal prosecutors 
spread across many jurisdictions. While the Department of Justice endeavors to 
create consistency through the guidance it promulgates for its many offices, the 
ultimate sentencing decision most often lies in the discretion of individual 
prosecutors. 
With respect to the Eighth Amendment, the Court likewise has 
demonstrated a hesitancy to limit state punishment practices.163 The backlash 
to Furman has led to a decision not to assess individual punishments on a case-
by-case basis but instead to impose only categorical limits.164 Despite using an 
evolving standards of decency test that relies in part on majoritarian legislative 
assessments to determine the scope of the Eighth Amendment, the Court’s 
cases reflect a concern about overturning statutes where the statutes are not 
outliers.165 The Court’s decision to hide behind majoritarian approaches instead 
of engaging in its own constitutional analysis as it did in Furman encompasses 
the same kind of sentiment displayed in the Sixth Amendment context—a fear 
of judging outside the confines of the framework established by legislatures. 
2.  Deference to State and Federal Legislatures 
Another reason that mandatory sentences persist relates to the value 
accorded to legislative institutions. In the context of the Guidelines, the Court 
expressed a need to accord the Guidelines a level of deference even in Booker.166 
Certainly Justice Breyer’s role in the creation of the Guidelines explains his 
advocacy for them in the Sixth Amendment cases, but other Justices embraced 
these values as well.167 
The underlying assumption is that the determination of the legislature 
(through the Commission) deserves more deference and weight than the 
individual discretion of judges at sentencing. The thumb on the scale in favor 
of consistency and presumed efficacy undermines the ability of the judge to 
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exercise sentencing discretion. This deference, though, really just reallocates 
sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. And the presence or absence 
of disparity remains largely unknown as a result of the black box of prosecutorial 
discretion. At least with judicial discretion variances, the disparities are 
apparent and transparent. 
In the Eighth Amendment context, the Court likewise weighed 
institutional considerations in developing its doctrinal approach to 
punishments. The backlash of the many state statutes in response to the Court’s 
decision in Furman filtered into its standard for evaluating the constitutionality 
of particular sentences under the Eighth Amendment. This evolving standards 
of decency approach relied first on assessing the objective majoritarian practice 
with respect to the punishment in question, despite the role of the Eighth 
Amendment as a protection against majoritarian overreach. 
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Court’s evolving standards of decency cases 
(which were all 5–4 decisions) embodies this particular sentiment. Scalia has 
repeatedly castigated the Court for failing to defer to the punishment practices 
authorized by state legislatures. In Atkins v. Virginia168 and Roper v. Simmons,169 
for example, Scalia chastised his fellow Justices for allegedly substituting their 
personal views for those of legislators.170 
The Court’s hesitancy to overturn state statutes explains in part the 
Court’s unwillingness to extend the individualized sentencing construct beyond 
capital and JLWOP cases to other kinds of mandatory sentences. Its view of 
deferring to majoritarian legislative sentiment remains an obstacle to Eighth 
Amendment expansion. 
III.  THE CASE FOR BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON 
MANDATORY SENTENCING 
In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the constitutional limits on state 
and federal sentencing fail to offer a coherent vision for the exercise of 
sentencing discretion. Specifically, the limits on sentencing should promote the 
individualized sentencing consideration of the individual actor. The Sixth 
Amendment’s protection of the right to trial by jury should frame this limit on 
the front end—in the definition of the crime itself—while the Eighth 
Amendment should delineate the scope of acceptable punishment for the crime 
in question on the back end. 
Individualized sentencing consideration thus requires careful 
consideration of both the criminal acts of the offender and the individual 
characteristics of the offender. Section 3553 requires such a focus. The question 
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of just deserts mandates a careful inquiry into the culpability of the offender, 
derived from the individual’s perpetration of the crime, as opposed to the 
general category of crime itself. The Guidelines attempt to capture this but 
cannot capture every nuance that might be relevant as to the question of 
culpability. Similarly, the utilitarian purposes of punishment merit 
individualized consideration of the characteristics of the offender. 
Dangerousness arguably connects to prior criminal acts, but while prior crimes 
are relevant, they do not necessarily measure dangerousness. Likewise, 
consideration of deterrence and rehabilitation relate to the characteristics of the 
offender. In terms of deterrence, the characteristics point to who would be 
deterred; in terms of rehabilitation, the characteristics point to the time needed 
for correction. 
As discussed, both Sixth and Eighth Amendment doctrine point to the 
need for individualized sentencing consideration—and in some cases require it. 
But the doctrine is incomplete under both Amendments as neither completely 
proscribes mandatory or pseudo-mandatory imposition of criminal sentences. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, but they 
exert such a heavy presumptive weight that they might as well be mandatory in 
many cases. Under the Eighth Amendment, mandatory death sentences and 
mandatory JLWOP sentences are unconstitutional, but these requirements do 
not extend to other sentences. 
Rectifying the incomplete doctrinal evolution of each of these 
Amendments with respect to mandatory sentences would accomplish this goal. 
In other words, the Court took important first steps in limiting mandatory 
sentencing practices under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments but should go 
further under each Amendment to restrict or eliminate mandatory sentencing 
practices. 
Interestingly, the incomplete doctrinal evolution of each of these 
Amendments points to the intellectual gap in the other. The gap in the Sixth 
Amendment is that the Guidelines do not capture the complete individualized 
sentencing consideration otherwise required by § 3553. This means that 
advisory guidelines allow pseudo-mandatory sentences. A bright-line standard 
like the one adopted in the Eighth Amendment context with respect to 
mandatory death and JLWOP would ensure that judges engage in 
individualized sentencing consideration beyond the Guidelines. The gap in the 
Eighth Amendment is its limited application. Its mandatory sentence 
proscription only applies to mandatory death sentences and mandatory JWLOP 
sentences. Emulating the Sixth Amendment’s applicability of mandatory 
limitations across all sentences would fill in the doctrinal gap of the Eighth 
Amendment. The Sixth Amendment’s application can thus provide guidance 
about how to remedy the Eighth Amendment; likewise, the Eighth 
Amendment’s application can do the same for the Sixth Amendment. The 
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Court is unlikely, without prompting, to continue the doctrinal evolution 
toward eliminating mandatory sentences. The cross-pollination of the two 
Amendments, though, can open the door to arguments that can help advance 
the evolution of each. 
A. Rectifying the Sixth Amendment 
1.  Where the Court Went Wrong 
The decision in Booker, with respect to the appropriate remedy for the 
Sixth Amendment violation of mandatory sentencing guidelines, in essence 
created the problem. In order to accord defendants their Sixth Amendment 
rights, the Court could have required that the facts leading to Guidelines 
enhancements be charged and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Alternatively, the Court could have struck down the Guidelines altogether. But 
the current approach allows judicial fact-finding to persist on the assurance that 
the Guidelines are not mandatory even though there is a strong leaning toward 
their determinative effect. 
One way of understanding Justice Ginsburg’s decision in Booker is as a 
middle-of-the-road, Goldilocks-type splitting of the difference. If having no 
guidelines was too far in the direction of favoring judicial discretion and having 
mandatory guidelines was too far in the direction of limiting judicial discretion, 
making guidelines advisory was a solution that was “just right.” Advisory 
guidelines could promote consistency while still affording a judge the 
opportunity to deviate in the extreme or unfair case. Such an approach 
maintained all of the value of a bright-line rule with none of the negative 
consequences of hard cases at the margins. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in 
Kimbrough reflected this sentiment,171 but the behavior of judges—both district 
and appellate—since Booker has reflected a hesitancy to depart from the 
Guidelines. 
Beyond Booker, the Court’s post-Booker cases—Gall, Kimbrough, and Rita—
did not go far enough in guiding federal sentencing discretion with respect to 
the Guidelines’ advisory nature. If anything, these decisions had the effect of 
reinforcing the primacy of the Guidelines. 
The better approach would be to allow the purposes of punishment under 
§ 3553 to guide the sentencing decision—with the Guidelines being available as 
a resource in hard cases—as opposed to the other way around—where the 
Guidelines receive the presumption of correctness. The draconian nature of the 
Guidelines and the politicized “tough on crime” origins of this punishment 
scheme counsel against according it the pseudo-mandatory deference it 
currently receives. 
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99 N.C. L. REV. 1311 (2021) 
2021] THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT NEXUS 1337 
The Court’s decision to require a calculation under the Guidelines in each 
case and then require judges to justify any departure reinforces the intellectual 
disconnect between the Guidelines and § 3553. As explained, the Guidelines 
focus almost exclusively on retributive and incapacitation justifications for 
punishment, while ignoring deterrence and retribution. By contrast, § 3553 
requires consideration of all these purposes and the individualized facts that 
undergird each purpose. Starting with the statute and referring to the 
Guidelines in outlier cases would better accord criminal defendants their Sixth 
Amendment rights at sentencing. 
2.  How the Eighth Amendment Can Help 
The Court’s decisions in Woodson and Miller drew bright lines. Mandatory 
death sentences and mandatory JLWOP sentences violated the Eighth 
Amendment. The Sixth Amendment remedy proposed by Justice Stevens in his 
dissent in the remedy part of Booker would have gone much further to achieve 
a similar proscription for mandatory sentencing guidelines. 
But even without revisiting the decision in Booker, the sentencing model 
advanced by Woodson and Miller can be instructive for judges attempting to 
apply the Guidelines. These cases emphasize the importance and 
meaningfulness of individualized sentencing determinations. If district judges 
give more weight to individualized circumstances, the pseudo-mandatory power 
of the Guidelines diminishes. 
And such an approach is not foreign under the Sixth Amendment post-
Apprendi. Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Rita emphasizes this kind of exercise 
of discretion.172 The sentencing decision of federal judges should incorporate 
this kind of individualized thinking in considering all aggravating and 
mitigating evidence, instead of being captured by presumptive guidelines. In 
other words, the approach in Woodson and Miller should guide the application 
of § 3553. Judges should look carefully at the aggravating and mitigating 
evidence when crafting a sentence, as opposed to simply relying on the 
Guidelines. 
To the extent that this move creates more disparity, appellate courts can 
limit it. This approach also opens the door for the creation of a federal common 
law of sentencing as opposed to the current federal appellate-mandated use of 
advisory guidelines. Reasonableness review should have a common-law element 
to it and not simply reflect guidelines that are no longer mandatory. 
Even if appellate courts were to give district courts deference, potential 
disparities in sentencing outcomes would be apparent in a way that they are 
currently not—in the hands of prosecutors. Judge Frankel’s critique of 
sentencing disparities resulted from his ability to review the sentences imposed 
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by different courts and to observe the lack of consistency. If the Guidelines 
drive the sentencing outcomes, then the disparity becomes hidden in the black 
box of prosecutorial decision-making. In other words, the disparity persists—it 
just lies in disparate outcomes in prosecutors’ decisions as opposed to disparate 
sentencing outcomes. With the latter, at least, the problems remain visible. 
B. Rectifying the Eighth Amendment 
Just as Eighth Amendment doctrine can provide tools by which to narrow 
the consequence of pseudo-mandatory sentences under the Guidelines, the 
Sixth Amendment can also help provide tools to limit the use of mandatory 
sentences that the Eighth Amendment cannot yet reach. 
1.  Where the Court Went Wrong 
The Court’s Eighth Amendment shortcomings relate to the limits of its 
differentness bright-line test. Because death is different, mandatory death 
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment. Because JWLOP is also different, 
mandatory JLWOP sentences also violate the Eighth Amendment. But no other 
sentences are classified as different. As such, all other noncapital mandatory 
sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
To be sure, the bright line does not withstand scrutiny. If individualized 
consideration is so critical in capital and JLWOP cases, it is likewise important 
in LWOP cases, which have essentially the same consequence—death in prison. 
And other mandatory sentences can cause deprivations that have serious effects 
based on their timing or length. These cases likewise deserve individualized 
sentencing consideration for defendants. 
Even if the consequences are less severe, blindly imposing a mandatory 
sentence irrespective of the details of the offender’s criminal act or personal 
characteristics presumes a level of foreknowledge on the part of the legislature 
in divining exactly how much punishment is appropriate for the offender 
despite potential aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Like strict liability, 
such sentences should be disfavored if not eliminated.173 Indeed, all criminal 
sentences should be subject to the individualized sentencing requirements of 
Woodson and Miller. 
The result of this approach would be for the Eighth Amendment to bar 
mandatory sentences. This fits with the notion of individualized sentencing and 
human dignity encapsulated in the Eighth Amendment. Each offender would 
receive their day in court and have the opportunity to speak to the appropriate 
sentence for their crime. 
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2.  How the Sixth Amendment Can Help 
In light of the current composition of the Supreme Court, expansion of 
the Eighth Amendment is unlikely.174 Treatment of the Sixth Amendment 
nonetheless points to several justifications for expansion. First, the Apprendi-
Booker limits on mandatory guidelines apply to all criminal sentences. If the 
Court did not limit the application of the Sixth Amendment to mandatory 
capital and JLWOP sentences, it follows that the Court should not limit the 
Eighth Amendment in that way either. 
The Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States,175 however, provides 
another tool to partially blunt the imposition of mandatory minimum 
sentences.176 The Supreme Court overruled Harris v. United States177 and made 
the Sixth Amendment apply to sentences that increase the statutory minimum, 
as well as the maximum (as established by Apprendi), making the burden to 
establish mandatory minimum sentences higher in that the elements must all 
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.178 
The corollary of this concept is that guidelines do limit mandatory 
minimums when constitutionally questionable. Alleyne shows that mandatory-
minimum sentences can be unconstitutional when they rely on facts determined 
by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. As such, mandatory minimums 
should face constitutional scrutiny. If the Sixth Amendment can apply to 
mandatory minimum sentences, it follows that the Eighth Amendment can 
apply as well. 
Finally, the Court’s decision in Alleyne to overrule itself with respect to a 
constitutional decision concerning mandatory sentences suggests it can do the 
same thing with respect to noncapital sentences under the Eighth Amendment. 
In other words, stare decisis seemingly does not preclude expansion of the 
Eighth Amendment to reach other noncapital mandatory sentences if the Court 
can overrule its application of the Sixth Amendment to mandatory minimums 
as it did in Alleyne. 
C. The Future of Mandatory Sentencing 
Mandatory sentencing practices, both in terms of the pseudo-mandatory 
Guidelines and in terms of mandatory state sentences, continue to create 
excessive, unconstitutional sentences that contribute significantly to the mass 
incarceration epidemic in the United States. While financial concerns have led 
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to some reform in criminal statutes and sentencing practices in recent years, the 
public appetite for abolishing mandatory sentences does not exist on such a level 
to eliminate such practices entirely, or even limit them meaningfully. 
The nexus of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments demonstrates, however, 
that each Amendment, if extended, could meaningfully curb such practices. It 
remains to be seen whether the current conservative-leaning Supreme Court is 
likely to place additional limits on pseudo-mandatory and mandatory 
sentencing practices. 
The ways in which each Amendment might inform the other, as indicated, 
opens the door to a broader judicial recognition of both of these important 
rights—the right to trial by jury and the right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishments. While the latter has tended to split along traditional party lines, 
the former has not. As such, the Sixth Amendment seems more likely to serve 
as a vehicle for further limiting mandatory sentencing practices. 
The nexus of the core values of individualized sentencing under both 
Amendments likewise makes the case for expansion of both doctrinal 
frameworks to limit or even eliminate mandatory sentencing practices. As the 
Court’s cases under both Amendments recognize, the solution to disparate 
sentencing outcomes does not lie in mandatory sentencing. As such, allowing 
mandatory sentencing to persist undermines a core notion of punishment—that 
the punishment should fit the criminal act and character of the offender. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the intersection of the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments in light of the twentieth anniversary of the decision in Apprendi. 
These two amendments have followed the same trajectory in placing limitations 
on mandatory sentences. Even so, mandatory or pseudo-mandatory sentences 
have persisted. By borrowing doctrinally and thematically from each other, the 
Sixth and Eighth Amendments can fill in the gaps of each other to further limit, 
or at least minimize, the use of pseudo-mandatory and mandatory sentences. 
